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A Model Statute for the Development of Oil and 
Gas Interests Held Under Joint Ownership 
Like many other interests in property, the oil and gas 
rights in a single tract of land are often held by more than one 
person. Concurrent ownership of oil and gas rights can take the 
form of "tenancy in common, joint tenancy, tenancy by entirety, 
coparcenary, community property and partnership property."' 
Because cotenants2 simultaneously have "equal rights in the 
possession and use" of the p r ~ p e r t y , ~  conflicts often arise when 
one cotenant wants to develop the resources but another does 
not. This Comment will discuss whether a cotenant of an oil 
and gas mineral interest has the right to explore, develop, or 
otherwise exploit the resources without the consent of the other 
~o tenan t s .~  
States follow one of two rules when confronted with this 
issue. The majority rule does not require cotenant consent, 
while the minority rule does to varying degrees. Part  I of this 
Comment introduces the English statutes that form the founda- 
tion for both rules. Part I1 discusses the majority rule by look- 
ing a t  case law and statutory law of states that follow this rule. 
Part I11 then analyzes the minority rule. Part IV presents a n  
administrative scheme that represents a compromise between 
the two rules in an effort to equitably protect cotenants holding 
either majority or minority interests. 
I. THE LAW AGAINST WASTE AND THE RULE OF ACCOUNTING 
Two English statutes provide the framework within which 
states have developed their current laws concerning the rights 
cotenants enjoy to independently develop the common property. 
Indeed, "the lack of uniformity in the law among the states [in 
1. 1 EUGENE KUNIZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS 8 5.1 (1987). 
2. Although the various forms of co-ownership differ in many respects, both 
in theory and practical effect, the term "cotenants" will be used in this Comment 
to describe "any situation in which two or more persons simultaneously may assert 
interests-socially-enforced claims-referable to an item of realty." JOHN E. CRIBBET 
ET AL., CASES AND MATER~Ls  ON PROPEMY 322 (6th ed. 1990). 
3. Id. 
4. This Comment discusses the attributes of joint ownership only tangen- 
tially. For a general discussion of joint ownership, see 4A RICHARD R. POWELL, 
THE LAW OF REAL PROPEMY chs. 49-52 (1991). 
1318 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I993 
this area] can best be described in the light of the varying 
interpretation of [these] statutes or their contemporary coun- 
terpart~."~ 
A. The Law Against Waste 
The Statute of Westminster IIP6 passed in 1285, is the first 
codified expression of the law against waste. Prior to this stat- 
ute, "there was no action for waste in favor of one cotenant 
against another cotenant."? The statute provided that, 'Where- 
as two or more do hold Wood, Turf-land, or Fishing, or other 
such thing in common, . . . and some of them do Waste against 
the Minds of the other, an Action may lie by a Writ of Waste."' 
In an action for waste, the statute provided a choice of two 
remedies. First, the land could be partitioned and "the Part 
wasted shall be assigned" to the defendant.g Second, the defen- 
dant could be restrained and ordered "to take nothing from 
henceforth in the [land] . . . but as his Partners will take."1° 
Many states have adopted similar statutes. For example, 
Alaska provides the following: 
If a guardian, tenant for life or years, or tenant in common of 
real property commits waste on the property, a person injured 
by the waste may bring an action for damages for the injury. 
In an action for waste there may be judgment for treble dam- 
ages. Where the plaintiff has a reversionary interest and the 
injury due to waste equals or exceeds the value of the interest 
held by the one committing the waste, or the waste is commit- 
ted with malice, judgment may be for forfeiture of the estate 
and eviction." 
Alaska's statute, like most other state statutes,12 does not spe- 
cifically define the term "waste." Consequently, the term must 
be defined by the state courts. The Alaska courts have stated 
5. 1 KUNTZ, supra note 1, § 5.2. 
6. Statute of Westminster 11, 1285, 13 Edw., ch. 22 (Eng.). 
7. 1 KUN~Z, supra note 1, 8 5.2. 
8. 13 Edw., ch. 22 (emphasis added) (spelling modernized). 
9. Id. 
10. Id. 
11. ALASKA STAT. $ 09.45.740 (1983). 
12. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. $ 5307.21 (Anderson 1989) ("One coparcener 
may maintain an action of waste against another coparcener."); WYO. STAT. $ 1-32- 
119 (1977) ("One (1) parcener may maintain an adion of waste against another, 
but no parcener shall possess any privileges over another in any election, division, 
partition or matter to be made or done concerning lands which have descended."). 
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that waste occurs when a cotenant engages in conduct that 
either results in physical damage to the land or substantial 
diminution in value of the common property.13 
Because the various state jurisdictions must individually 
define "waste," it is not surprising that a lack of uniformity 
exists in determining whether development of oil and gas inter- 
ests by one cotenant without the consent of the other cotenants 
constitutes "waste." As will be discussed in detail, a majority of 
states hold that such conduct does not constitute waste;14 
however, a minority of states maintain that a nonconsenting 
cotenant may have an action for waste against a cotenant's 
development. l5 
B. The Rule of Accounting 
Like the law of waste, the rule requiring a cotenant to 
account to  fellow cotenants for all profits and rents received 
from the common property had its genesis in early English 
legislation. The rule of accounting was established in 1705 by 
the Statute of Anne," which reads as follows: 
[Alctions of account shall and may be brought and main- 
tained . . . by one joint tenant, and tenant in common, his 
executors and administrators, against the other, as bailiff for 
receiving more than comes to his just share or propor- 
tion . . . .I7 
The rule giving a cotenant the right t o  seek an accounting has 
been statutorily adopted in most states. For example, 
Arkansas's ''Ftight of cotenants to  accountingyy statute reads as 
follows: 
(a) When any joint tenant, tenant in common, or coparce- 
ner in any real estate, or any interest therein, shall take, use, 
or have the profits and benefits thereof in greater proportion 
than his interest therein, that person, or his executor or ad- 
ministrator, shall account' therefor to his cotenant or 
cotenants, jointly or severally. 
(b) Joint tenants, tenants in common, and coparceners in 
any real or personal estate may maintain civil actions against 
13. See McKibben v. Mohawk Oil Co., 667 P.2d 1223 (Alaska 1983). 
14. See i f i a  part 11. 
15. See i f i a  part 111. 
16. 1 KUNTZ, supra note 1, 8 5.2. 
17. Statute of Anne, 1705, 4 h e ,  ch. 16, 8 27 (Eng.) (spelling modernized). 
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their cotenants who receive as bailiffs more than their due 
proportion of the benefits of the estate.18 
Other states have similar statutes.lg Thus, depending on the 
jurisdiction, the interaction of the law against waste and the 
rule of accounting provides a cotenant with two possible reme- 
dies when another cotenant extracts oil and gas. If extraction of 
the resources without consent is considered waste, the cotenant 
can seek an injunction to stop the activity and obtain damages. 
Alternatively, the extracting cotenant may be able to  continue 
the venture, but other cotenants may bring suit seeking an 
accounting for any profits over his proportional share.20 
18. ARK. CODE ANN. 8 18-60-101 (Michie 1987). However, in Arkansas, the . 
right to an accounting does not apply to the tenancy by the entirety of a husband 
and wife. See Wood v. Wright, 386 S.W.2d 248 (Ark. 1965). Also, for a discussion 
of the interesting issue of the interaction between a cotenant making improvements 
on the land and the right to accounting by the other cotenants, see Cocke v. 
Clausen, 55 S.W. 846 (Ark. 1900). 
19. For a sampling of other state statutes, see ALA. CODE 8 6-7-40 (1985) ("A 
joint tenant, tenant in common, or tenant in coparcenary may commence an action 
against his cotenant or coparcener, or personal representative for receiving more 
than his lawful proportion."); ALASKA STAT. 8 34.15.120 (1990) ("A tenant in com- 
mon may maintain an action against a cotenant for receiving more than the fair 
share of the rents and profits of the estates owned by them in common."); OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. 8 5307.21 (Anderson 1991) ("One tenant in common, or coparce- 
ner, may recover from another tenant in common, or coparcener[,] his share of 
rents and profits received by such tenant in common or coparcener from the estate, 
according to the justice and equity of the case."); WYO. STAT. 8 1-32-119 (1977) 
("One (1) tenant in common or coparcener may recover from another his share of 
rents and profits received by the tenant in common or coparcener from the es- 
tate."). 
20. It should be noted here, as will be shown later, that the rule requiring a 
cotenant to account to other cotenants is essentially followed in both the majority 
and minority jurisdictions. Consequently, the real issue is whether the 
nonconsenting cotenant has one or two remedies. Generally, he will always be able 
to force an accounting, but he may also have the right to enjoin the activity and 
seek damages if the jurisdiction considers extraction without consent of the other 
cotenants waste. 
It should also be mentioned that the rule of waste applies uniformly in all 
. jurisdictions in some situations. For example, in all jurisdictions, "operations that 
result in permanent damage to the land when such operations are not necessary to 
the extraction of minerals from the same land" are considered waste, whether 
performed by a cotenant or someone acting under his direction. 1 KUNTZ, supra 
note 1, 8 5.2. Therefore, this Comment is limited to the question of whether ex- 
traction of the oil and gas is considered waste when those operations are legiti- 
mate and necessary to the development and extraction of the resources. 
This is also a good place to mention what this Comment will not cover in any 
great detail. First, the rules and methods which individual jurisdictions have 
adopted to define and govern accounting actions will not be arrayed or elaborated 
upon. The various methods used are vast and often complex enough to serve as 
OIL AND GAS RIGHTS 
These two statutes, the law against waste and the rule of 
accounting, form the framework for the majority and minority 
rules which will now be discussed in detail.21 Case law and 
statutes of states following each rule will be presented, empha- 
sizing the rationale used by the respective states in choosing 
one rule over the other. 
11. THE RIGHT TO EXTRACT OIL AND GAS WITHOUT CONSENT: 
THE MAJORITY RULE 
A. Prairie Oil & Gas Co. v. Allen and the Majority Rule 
The seminal case describing the majority rule arises out of 
an Oklahoma fact situation. In Prairie Oil & Gas Co. v. 
Allen owned a one-tenth interest in the oil and gas 
underlying an expansive tract of land. Her cotenants and own- 
ers of the other nine-tenths interest in the oil and gas began 
developing and producing the resources. Allen did not consent 
to the extraction and sued, claiming that because of her 
nonconsent the operators were trespassers and liable for con- 
version.23 
The Eighth Circuit disagreed. It first recognized that Allen 
and the defendants were indeed tenants in common and as 
such "may make such reasonable use of the common property 
as is necessary to  enjoy the benefit and value of such owner- 
individual paper topics themselves. For a nice overview of some of the major prin- 
ciples involved in accounting actions, see Howard R. Williams, The Effect of Con- 
current Interests on Oil and Gas Transactions, 34 TEX. L. REV. 519, 523-34 (1956). 
Furthermore, concurrent owners may use any remedy available to other joint 
owners of other property interests, other than the two listed above (suit in dam- 
ages for waste and accounting). A concurrent owner may also seek partition, equi- 
table partition, and development and management under a receiver. But these 
remedies are generally not economically feasible. Because these remedies are diffl- 
cult to apply to oil and gas interests, this Comment will focus on the two remedies 
listed earlier. For more information on other remedies available, see Ernest E. 
Smith, Methods for Facilitating the Development of Oil and Gas Lands Burdened 
with Outstanding Mineral Interests, 43 TEX. L. REV. 129, 136-50 (1964); 'Williams, 
supra, at  534-49. 
21. It should be mentioned that all states but one have these two rules as 
part of their common law or statutory law, derived from English jurisprudence. 
The exception, of course, is Louisiana, whose law grew out of the French Civil 
Code. "In Louisiana, the Statutes of Westminster 11 and Anne are not part of the 
traditional law, nor have counterparts of such statutes been enacted." 1 KUNTZ, 
supra note 1, 8 5.4. That is not to say that Louisiana does not have similar doc- 
trines; it does. These doctrines are simply founded on different traditions. See infia 
part 1II.A. 
22. 2 F.2d 566 (8th Cir. 1924). 
23. Id. at 569-70. 
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ship."24 The court then implicitly ruled that the extraction of 
oil and gas is not considered waste. It stated that an oil and 
gas interest "can only be enjoyed by removing the products 
thereof" and therefore, the "extraction of oil from an oil well 
[is] the use and not the destruction of the estate."25 The court 
then stated what is now the majority rule: "This being true (the 
fact that extraction of oil is not waste), a tenant in common, 
without the consent of his cotenant, has the right to develop 
and operate the common property for oil and gas and for that 
purpose may drill wells and erect necessary plants."26 
The rationale the court used to  support the right to  extract 
oil and gas without receiving the consent of cotenants was 
based primarily on circumstances potentially arising out of the 
law of capture. In describing the law of capture, the court 
wrote that oil, as a "fugitive substance," is always in danger of 
being "drained from the land by [a] well on adjoining proper- 
t ~ . " ' ~  In order to protect his interest, the cotenant must act 
"promptly" before the oil is taken, and "if a cotenant owning a 
small interest in the land had to give his consent" before the 
other cotenants could act, the nonconsenting cotenant "could 
arbitrarily destroy the valuable quality of the land.'a8 Howev- 
er, the court offered no further rationale for why the cotenants 
in Prairie Oil had the right to develop and produce the miner- 
als where there was no evidence that the oil was being drained 
or in danger of being drained. 
Although the extraction of oil and gas without the consent 
of all cotenants is not considered waste in Oklah0ma,2~ the 
24. Id. at 571. 
25. Id. (emphasis added). 
26. Id. The court did add that this rule does have a limitation: the cotenant 
may not "exclude his cotenant from exercising the same rights and privileges." Id. 
27. Id. (quoting Burnham v. Hardy Oil Co., 147 S.W. 330, 335 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1912). 
28. Id. (quoting Burnham, 147 S.W. at 335). The same rationale is expressed 
in a California case. The California Supreme Court held that "it is not waste for a 
cotenant to go upon the land and produce oil" even without the consent of the 
other cotenants. DabneyJohnston Oil Corp. v. Walden, 52 P.2d 237, 246 (Cal. 
1935). The court considered the taking of oil and gas to be using the estate rather 
than destroying it. "This principle," the court stated, "is of special importance in 
regard to fugacious substances, which may be lost entirely through drilling opera- 
tions on other lands if the owners do not diligently seek to reduce them to posses- 
sion." Id.; cf. McIntosh v. Ropp, 82 A. 949 (Pa. 1912) ("[Olwing to the fugacious 
nature of oil and gas, . . . it is peculiarly necessary that cotenants should not be 
unduly restricted in the enjoyment of such properties."). 
29. The rule applied in Prairie Oil was already well established in Oklahoma 
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nonconsenting cotenant does have the right to force the pro- 
ducing cotenant to account for all profits obtained. This duty to 
account is generally established by statuteS0 and is specifically 
applied to oil and gas extraction by case law.31 
The rule established in Prairie Oil has had precedential 
influence in other states that have considered this issue. In 
1976, the Supreme Court of Georgia decided for the first time 
whether it would require consent from nondeveloping cotenants 
when another cotenant desired to  develop jointly held oil and 
gas rights. In Slade u. Rudman Resources, Inc.,S2 plaintiffs 
owned a one-half interest both in the surface and in the miner- 
als in the property at issue. Plaintiffs sued their cotenants 
(owners of the remaining one-half interest), seeking a declara- 
tory judgment that the cotenants "have no rights of. . . use in 
or to the subject real property without [plaintiffs'] consent."33 
The court initially established the rule that "a grant of 
minerals conveys, by implication, the rights of ingress and 
egress, and possession of the surface necessary to the use and 
enjoyment of the estate conveyed.7734 However, the issue of 
whether this right could be exercised without consent of co- 
owners was a "question of first impression.'735 After being con- 
fronted with both the majority and minority rules, the court 
adopted "the prevailing [majority] rule because it makes 
sense."36 Therefore, in Georgia, "a co-tenant has . . . the right 
case law. In Moody v. Wagner, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that 
each tenant in common has the right to enter upon the common premises 
and explore and develop the same for oil and gas and to produce such 
products from the premises, provided however, that a cotenant cannot 
exclude his cotenant from exercising the same right with reference to the 
common property. 
Moody v. Wagner, 23 P.2d 633, 635 (Okla. 1933). However, Prairie Oil is important 
for its explicit language that this right is fully available whether or not the other 
cotenant or cotenants consent. 
30. "A joint tenant, or tenant in common, or tenant in coparcenary, may 
maintain an action against his wtenant or coparcener, or their personal representa- 
tives, for receiving more than his just proportion of the rents and profits." OKLA. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 41, § 21 (West 1986). For more information on co-ownership in 
Oklahoma, see Osborne M. Reynolds, Jr., Co-ownership of Property in Oklahoma, 
27 OKLA. L. REV. 585 (1974). 
31. See Prairie Oil, 2 F.2d at 573; Moody, 23 P.2d at 635-36; Airington v. 
Airington, 192 P. 689, 690 (Okla. 1920). 
32. 230 S.E.2d 284 (Ga. 1976). 
33. Id. at 285. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. at 286. 
36. Id. The court does not reveal exactly why the majority view "made sense." 
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to enter and mine the common property, without the consent of 
his co-tenants, but subject to his accounting to the other co- 
tenants for their respective  share^."^' Therefore, simply be- 
cause it "made sense," the Georgia Supreme Court adopted the 
majority view, limiting the remedy a nonconsenting cotenant 
has to a forced a~counting.~' 
In Davis v. B ~ r d , ~ ~  a Missouri court of appeals was given 
the task of determining whether development of a mineral 
interest held in co-ownership, without the consent of other 
cotenants, constituted "waste" under the Missouri statutes. 
Like Slade u. Rudman Resources in Georgia,"' this issue was 
one of first impression in Missouri? In Davis, plaintiffs 
sought to enjoin their cotenant defendants from extracting 
minerals from the common e~ta te . '~  The primary premise of 
their arguments was that extraction of minerals from jointly 
owned property constituted waste. 
Missouri statutory law establishes that if "a tenant in 
common, joint tenant or parcener commit waste, he shall be 
liable to his cotenants, jointly or severally, for damages."43 
The court recognized that "two distinct rules" exist in relation 
to the issue of development of mineral interests without con- 
sent of other cotenants: one that considers such activity waste 
and another that does not.'* In determining which rule to fol- 
low, the court looked to neighboring jurisdictions, namely Okla- 
h ~ m a ~ ~  and Kansas.46 After a "thorough study of the applica- 
It  probably made sense because it was the right thing to do. Nevertheless, no 
other rationale is given. 
37. Id. 
38. See GA. CODE ANN. § 23-2-70 (Harrison 1982) ("Equity jurisdiction over 
matters of account shall extend to: . . . (5) Accounts between partners or tenants 
in common . . . ."). 
39. 185 S.W.2d 866 (Mo. Ct. App. 1945). 
40. 230 S.E.2d at  286; see supm note 35 and accompanying text. 
41. Concerning the plaintiff's claim that a tenant in common "may prevent 
the mining of mineral lands by refusing to join his cotenant in the enterprise," the 
court wrote that "[wle find no case in Missouri which we think is clearly in point 
and none has been cited that is decisive of this question." Dauis, 185 S.W.2d at 
867. 
42. Although this case deals with hard minerals, it nonetheless equally ap- 
plies to oil and gas. 
43. Mo. ANN. STAT. 8 537.460 (Vernon 1988). 
44. Davis, 185 S.W.2d at 867. 
45. Id. at 868 (citing Prairie Oil & Gas Co. v. Allen, 2 F.2d 566 (8th Cir. 
1924)). 
46. Id. (citing Compton v. People's Gas Co., 89 P. 1039 (Kan. 1907)). Kansas, 
like Oklahoma, follows the majority rule allowing cotenants to explore and extract 
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ble law," the court found that acting without the consent of 
cotenants did not constitute "waste under the waste statute in 
Missouri" and therefore an action for damages or an injunction 
was not a~ailable.~' 
One judge, concurring in the judgment, gave an often-used 
rationale for the majority rule. He wrote, "[Ilf the owner of one- 
half interest in mining land can prevent the owners of the 
other half. . . from mining . . . the owner of a thousandth in- 
terest can do likewise; the position of plaintiff is thus capable 
of reduction to absurdity."48 Therefore, in Missouri, like the 
oil and gas from the common property without the consent of the other cotenants. 
In Krug v. Krug, 618 P.2d 323 (Kan. Ct. App. 1980), this rule was strictly applied. 
Interestingly, the plaintiffs in Krug were the producing cotenants and the defen- 
dant was the nonconsenting co-owner. The plaintiffs, who owned a nine-elevenths 
interest in the minerals under a half-section of land, sought to compel their lessees 
and Krug (who owned the remaining two-elevenths interest) to explore and drill for 
oil under the tract. Id. at 324. The cause of the suit was Krug's unwillingness to 
work with plaintiff's lessees and the fact that a neighboring property was "presum- 
ably draining the pool thought to be under the land in question." Id. 
The court, without much discussion, reiterated the Kansas rule that cotenants 
have the right to explore and drill "even without [the] consent" of other cotenants. 
Id. at 325 (citing Compton, 89 P. 1039). Although not stated explicitly, it appears 
that the Kansas courts also do not consider such activity "waste" on the property 
and therefore, the cotenant has no injunctive or damages remedy. 
The court then stated the rule that a nonconsenting cotenant has the remedy 
to seek an accounting. Id. at 325-26. The right to recover rents and profits is also 
found at KAN. STAT. ANN. $ 58-2522 (1992), which reads, "A joint tenant, or tenant 
in common, or tenant in coparcenary, may maintain an action against his or her 
cotenant or coparcener or their personal representatives, for receiving more than 
his or her just proportion of the rents and profits." It is interesting to note that 
the rule of accounting can be used to require a nonconsenting cotenant to aid in 
the payment of production costs. The general rule of accounting is that the 
nonconsenting cotenant is allowed a percentage of the profits only after accounting 
to the producer for a "proportionate share of the expense of drilling, production, 
and, if need be, marketing." Krug, 618 P.2d at 325. However, in Kansas, the non- 
consenting cotenant must account for expenses only if there is production. There- 
fore, if a cotenant drills two holes, and the fwst is a producer and the second a 
dry hole, a nonconsenting cotenant is only required to pay drilling expenses on the 
first hole. Id. at 325-26; see also Davis v. Sherman, 86 P.2d 490 (Kan. 1939). 
47. Davis, 185 S.W.2d at 869. In establishing this rule, the court wrote, 
From a thorough study of the applicable law and the many cases cited 
we find that both the rules . . . are supported by respectable authorities. 
However, the greater weight of authority seems to hold that a tenant in 
common commits no wrong in entering upon the common property for the 
purpose of carrying on mining operations in the usual way and therefore 
cannot be held to be a trespasser; and that the removal of ore without 
willful injury to the common property or unnecessary destruction caused 
by negligence or unskillfulness does not constitute waste. 
Id. 
48. Id. (Blair, J., concurring in the judgment); cf Dabney-Johnston Oil Corp. 
1326 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I993 
other states discussed, a cotenant has the right to develop the 
mineral estate without the consent of the other cotenants, sub- 
ject only to  the rule requiring accounting. 
B. An Evaluation of the Majority Rule 
With the exception of four states:' all sigmficant oil pro- 
ducing states follow the majority rule that "a cotenant in the 
fee may enter to explore for and produce oil and gas without 
consent of his cot en ant^."^^ There appear to be three primary 
rationales used to substantiate this rule. First, because of the 
fugitive nature of oil and gas, and the law of capture, it is nec- 
essary to  allow each cotenant the complete right to extract the 
oil or  gas in order to  protect it from neighboring lands that may 
dip into the same ~001.~' Second, because the oil and gas must 
be removed to be enjoyed, exploration and removal of the re- 
sources does not constitute waste or destruction of the interest 
but rather the "use" of the interest.52 And third, requiring con- 
sent from all cotenants would allow one cotenant with a small 
interest to block the interests of the others with larger inter- 
ests; this seems to be inequitable or even irrational." 
v. Walden, 52 P.2d 237, 246 (Cal. 1935) ("A single cotenant should not be in a 
position to prevent beneficial utilization of the mineral estate by the other 
cotenants."). 
49. See infra part 111. 
50. 1 KUN'IZ, supra note 1, Q 5.3 (citing Prairie Oil & Gas Co. v. Allen, 2 
F.2d 566 (8th Cir. 1924)). For a small sampling of other states following this rule, 
see the following: 
Kentucky: Petroleum Exploration Corp. v. Hensley, 284 S.W.2d 828, 830 (Ky. 
Ct. App. 1955) (Because. the corporation was a cotenant, it "was not a trespasser" 
when it drilled and removed oil "as it had the right to drill on the commonly 
owned property without the consent of appellee."). 
Montana: Hochsprung v. Stevenson, 266 P. 406, 409 (Mont. 1928) (In a coten- 
ancy, "each of the cotenants may work [the property] without being guilty of 
waste."). 
Pennsylvania: McIntosh v. Ropp, 82 A. 949 (Pa. 1912) (The defendant was 
allowed to extract oil without the consent of the plaintiff co-owner, but was re- 
quired to account.). 
Texas: Rosse v. Northern Pump Co., 353 S.W.2d 287 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962) ("A 
tenant in common has the right to occupy the entire joint property [without con- 
sent] but if he removes oil or gas he must account to the co-tenant for the value 
of the proportionate shares of the oil and gas . . . ."). 
Utah: Bennion v. ANR Prod. Co., 819 P.2d 343 (Utah 1991). 
51. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text. 
52. See 1 K U m ,  supra note 1, Q 5.3; supra notes 25, 47 and accompanying 
text. 
53. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
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Few would argue against the first rationale. If the land is 
being drained by operations on neighboring lands, any cotenant 
should be allowed to, and perhaps has a duty to, prevent the 
drainage. Also, it is economically irrational that a cotenant 
would attempt to stop another cotenant who was extracting the 
oil and gas because it was being drained by a neighboring 
pump. Furthermore, because the subject property is rarely 
being drained in these cases, if the majority rule were limited 
to  drainage fad situations, it would have a very limited appli- 
cation. 
The second rationale is also defensible. Having a mineral 
interest is arguably worthless unless the mineral can be devel- 
oped. But in the oil and gas context this is not entirely true. 
Because of their speculative value, oil interests and leases can 
be very valuable before e~ploration.~~ If a cotenant would 
rather wait and sell his interest before it is determined wheth- 
er oil exists, or how much exists, in the property, why not allow 
him the right to stop development? Both cotenants own their 
interests in fee, so why should development always take prece- 
dence over resale speculative value? It is arguable that explor- 
ing for oil and determining the actual value of the interest is 
waste if the speculative value of the interest is thereby dimin- 
ished. 
The third rationale is not so convincing. If it is irrational 
or inequitable to allow a minority tenant to stop development, 
is it not equally irrational or  inequitable to  allow minority 
tenants to  develop the land when the majority would rather 
wait? If oil and gas prices are anticipated to  rise in the near 
future, it is quite reasonable to wait and develop when profits 
will be higher. Also, it may be wise to wait until explorations 
on surrounding parcels of land are carried out, especially if a 
cotenant is more interested in the speculative value of his min- 
eral interest. The third rationale supports the right of a coten- 
ant to  enjoin development as much as it supports the right of a 
cotenant to develop without consent. 
54. See Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Kishi, 291 S.W. 538 (Tex. Comm'n App. 
1927); Martel v. Hall Oil Co., 253 P. 862 (Wyo. 1927). For a good discussion of the 
speculative value associated with oil and gas interests, see Howard R. Williams & 
Charles J. Meyers, Adverse Possession and Trespass in the Law of Oil and Gas, 29 
ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 1, 43-61 (1956). 
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Before this Comment continues its discussion of these 
ideas,s5 the minority rule and its rationales need to be intro- 
duced. Unlike the majority-rule states, the states following the 
minority rule are not entirely congruent in their application. 
Much of this incongruence arises from the fact that statutory 
law plays a more active role in some minority-rule states than 
in majority-rule states. Because of this incongruence, and since 
only four states currently follow the minority rule, each of 
those states will be briefly discussed. 
A. Louisiana 
In Louisiana, unlike the states following the majority rule, 
the right a cotenant has to extract minerals is rather restrict- 
ed. The most ofi-cited Louisiana case implementing the minori- 
ty  rule is Gulf Refining Co. v. Carroll.56 In Carroll, the defen- 
dants (a father and son) entered into an installment contract in 
which the son received a one-half interest in a plantation. The 
son then leased his one-half mineral interest to the plaintiff. 
The son defaulted on the installment contract, and the father 
in turn sued to extinguish the contract. The lessee then 
brought suit to protect its leasehold interestO5' After a finding 
by the trial court that the lease was still effective:' the defen- 
dants appealed. 
On appeal, the court found that the lease was not valid. It 
stated, "Now the owner of an undivided half of a tract of land 
has not the right to exploit the land for oil and gas without the 
consent, implied or express, of his co-owner, and not having 
this right himself he cannot confer it upon a le~see."~ Much of 
the court's rationale of this rule was based on old Roman and 
French law?' "Co-owners are owners par mi et par tout, of 
55. See i*a part IV. 
56. 82 So. 277 (La. 1919). 
57. It seems that when the lease was entered into there was no knowledge of 
any oil on the property. Before the plaintiff company entered the land, oil was 
found on neighboring lands and apparently the lease had "became a disadvanta- 
geous one to the defendants." Carrdl, 82 So. at 278. The trial court found that the 
default had been "a mere collusive proceeding [by the defendants] to get rid of the 
lease" and thus upheld the lease. Id. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. 
60. The court extensively quoted ancient Roman and French property axioms. 
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part and of the whole. Neither of two co-owners has the exclu- 
sive right to any determinate part of the common property.'"' 
Therefore, either co-owner has a "veto" over any other co- 
owner's activity on the common land?' 
In summary, the court rationalized its opinion based on the 
fact that the defendants could oppose the drilling of a well by 
the plaintiff because the land "where the well is proposed to be 
bored belongs to [the defendants] as much as to the [plaintiffl," 
and neither is entitled to "exclusive possession of it."63 There- 
fore, at the very "moment the co-owners cannot agree," the only 
remedy available to either co-owner is "to demand a parti- 
t i ~ n . ' ~ ~  
Essentially, the minority rule, as developed in Carroll, 
states that because each cotenant owns a percentage of every 
element of the property, neither can have exclusive control 
without consent of the other. Allowing one cotenant to operate 
the entire parcel, even though he only owns a portion of it, 
seems to give him a greater right than justified by his inter- 
e ~ t . ~ ~  
However, this restrictiveness has recently been relaxed by 
statute. Prior to 1987, "unanimous consent among co-owners" 
was required before development of the mineral interest could 
In 1987, the Louisiana Mineral Code was amended t o  
require ninety percent rather than unanimous consent? And 
in 1988, the Code was again amended to its present form. To- 
day, the Code states that a cotenant "may not conduct opera- 
tions on the property subject to the servitude without the con- 
See id. at 278-80. Central to much of this analysis is the idea that a co-owner 
owns a quota of land rather than any specific entity. It is an overstepping of own- 
ership for one having only a quota of land (and an abstract quota at  that) to exer- 
cise on the totality of the common property. How can one exercise operations on 
the entire property when he owns only a quota of it, and really only a quota in 
the abstract because-absent a partition-the cotenant cannot point to any specific 
entity of the property that represents his quota? 
61. Id. at 278. 
62. See Patrick H. Martin & J. Lanier Yeates, Louisiana and T w s  Oil and 
Gas Law: An Overview of the Differences, 52 LA. L. REV. 769, 815 (1992). 
63. Carroll, 82 So. at 280. 
64. Id. The court added that "[alny other doctrine would lead to armed con- 
flict between the parties." Id. 
65. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text. 
66. Angela J. Crowder, Comment, Mineral Rights: The Requirement of Consent 
Among Co-Owners, 48 LA. L. REV. 931, 933 11.13 (1988); see also Guy E. Wall, 
Joint Oil and Gas Operations in Louisiana, 53 LA. L. REV. 79, 84 (1992). 
67. Wall, supra note 66, at  85. 
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sent of co-owners owning at least an undivided eighty percent 
interest in the servitude."68 
There is a "very limited" exception to this rule,pg which 
allows a cotenant to  act without the consent of the other 
cotenants. A cotenant is allowed "to prevent waste or destmc- 
tion or extinction" of the property by extracting the oil and gas 
without the normal unanimous consent req~irement.?~ Howev- 
er, thus far the courts have allowed this exception only when a 
neighboring property owner was draining the common proper- 
ty.?' Therefore, in Louisiana, a cotenant must jump through 
either of two hoops to operate on the land. First, he can obtain 
the consent of at least eighty percent of the other cotenants. 
Or, he can operate without obtaining consent if he is prevent- 
ing the destruction of the interest and can show irreparable 
harm. However, it is clear that both statutory law and jurispm- 
dence "strongly favor[] the nonconsenting co-owner."72 
68. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:175 (West 1989). The statute further states that 
the remaining cotenants who do not consent have "no liability for the costs of 
development and operations except out of [their] share of production." Id.; see also 
id. 8 31:164. 
69. Crowder, supra note 66, at 938-39. 
70. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:176 (West 1989). In full, the statute reads as 
follows: 
A co-owner of a mineral servitude may act to prevent waste or the de- 
struction or extinction of the servitude, but he cannot impose upon his co- 
owner liability for any costs of development or operation or other costs 
except out of production. He may lease or otherwise contract regarding 
the full ownership of the servitude but must act at all times in good 
faith and as a reasonably prudent mineral servitude owner whose interest 
is not subject to co-ownership. 
Id. As the statute makes clear, no liabilities can be placed on nonconsenting own- 
ers except out of production. Thus, a cotenant acting to prevent waste should still 
try to obtain consent because if the development proves to be costly and with little 
return, he is stuck with all costs even though he was only attempting to protect 
the property itself. 
71. The seminal case in this area is United Gas Public Service Co. v. 
Arkansas-Louisiana Pipe Line Co., 147 So. 66 (La. 1932). Crowder writes that the 
"only case to consider the matter since United Gas refused to allow one co-owner 
to operate without consent where he failed to show that he would suffer irrepara- 
ble injury." Crowder, supm note 66, at 939. Therefore, it appears that even though 
the statute allows a cotenant to act without consent to preserve the property, he 
must also show "irreparable injury"; such a judicial gloss would make it usually 
very difficult to succeed. And because the developing cotenant can easily be stuck 
with all liabilities of the development, see supra note 68, this exception can be a 
risky one to rely on. 
72. Crowder, supm note 66, at 944. For more on Louisiana oil law governing 
co-ownership of oil rights, see Martin & Yeates, supra note 62, at 814-17. 
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B. West Virginia 
Unlike Louisiana, West Virginia does not have a statutory 
scheme which explicitly states that a cotenant may not develop 
the land without consent of the cotenants. However, like many 
other states, West Virginia does have a statute prohibiting 
waste by a cotenant.73 The following question then arises: Are 
operations by a cotenant, without the consent of the other 
cotenants, on the common property considered waste? As previ- 
ously established, a large majority of states answer no.74 West 
Virginia jurisprudence, to the contrary, answers yes. 
In South Penn Oil Co. u. H a ~ g h t ~ ~  the West Virginia Su- 
preme Court held that a person holding a one-fourth interest in 
the oil and gas of a tract of land could enjoin the operations of 
the other cotenants. The court announced that the defendant 
"had no right to extract the oil without his cotenant's consent, 
and could confer no such right upon another [i.e., a lessee]."76 
The court then declared that extraction "by one joint tenant, of 
oil and gas without the consent of his cotenant, constitutes 
waste" and the plaintiff has a remedy of damages.77 
The West Virginia court announced in Law u. Heck Oil 
~ 0 . ~ ~  two limitations on the rule that operations without con- 
sent of a cotenant amount to waste. First, a cotenant may be 
able to extract oil and gas without consent if the pool is in 
danger of dissipation through drainage.7g Second, a cotenant's 
right is also subject to the rights of other cotenants to  "compel 
partition or sale as provided by statute."80 
73. "If a tenant in common, joint tenant, or parcener commit waste, he shall 
be liable to his cotenants, jointly or severally, for damages." W. VA. CODE 5 37-7-2 
(1966). 
74. See supra notes 25, 47, 52 and accompanying text. 
75. 78 S.E. 759 (W. Va. 1913). 
76. Id. at 761. 
77. Id.; see also Williamson v. Jones, 27 S.E. 411, 413 (W. Va. 1897) ('Waste 
is an injury to the freehold by one righthlly in possession. This marks the distinc- 
tion between waste and trespass." Without the consent of the other cotenants, the 
defendant was guilty of waste by boring for oil.) (citations omitted); Jeff L. Lewin 
et al., Unlocking the Fire: A Proposal for Judicial or Legislative Determination of 
the Ownership of Coalbed Methane, 94 W .  VA. L. REV. 563, 665 (1992). 
78. 145 S.E. 601 (W. Va. 1928). 
79. Id. The right to act in order to protect the interest from drainage is es- 
sentially recognized in every jurisdiction. However, whereas Louisiana requires a 
showing of "irreparable harm," West Virginia apparently only requires a showing 
that the pool is "being drained away" or that "such drainage will likely occur 
through other neighboring wells now drilling." Id. 
80. Id. 
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It also seems irrelevant how small the cotenant's interest 
may be. In Law, the court granted injunctive relief to a plain- 
tiff against the developing defendants, even though the plaintiff 
held only a 11768 interest in the oil and gas underlying a tract 
of 131% acres. A cotenant, the court stated, sits as "an unquali- 
fied owner of real estate or an interest therein [and] is entitled 
to have it remain in such condition as he sees fit."'' 
West Virginia also provides a statute giving a nonconsent- 
ing cotenant a right of a~counting.8~ Consequently, a noncon- 
senting cotenant has two possible causes of action against an 
operating cotenant: either an action for waste, in which he can 
receive an injunction or damages or both, or an action for ac- 
counting wherein he implicitly consents to  the operation and 
seeks his just proportion of the net proceeds. 
C. Illinois 
Early Illinois case law established a clear rule that "one 
tenant in common may not operate oil against the protest or 
without the consent of the other tenants in ~ornrnon."~~ To so 
act would constitute waste and destruction of the property 
rights." Indeed, the rule was rather harsh. In essence, it "re- 
quires [the cotenants] to agree upon the operation of the land 
for oil and If the cotenants could not agree, the only 
remedy was partition." 
Eventually, the Illinois courts did develop one exception 
from the firm rule that any operation on the land without the 
consent of all the cotenants was considered waste. In the con- 
text of oil and gas interests, one court held that the "stern rule 
of liability of a cotenant, who commits waste or damage to  the 
common property, has been relaxed where the profit taken 
from the land is of a fugacious nature and liable to  be exhaust- 
ed by adjacent operators."' Thus, like other states, Illinois 
recognized an exception to the waste rule when the land was 
81. Id. 
82. "An action of account may be maintained . . . by one joint tenant, tenant 
in common, or coparcener or his personal representative against the other, or 
against the personal representative of the other, for receiving more than his just 
share or proportion." W. VA. CODE $ 55-8-13 (1966). 
83. Zeigler v. Brenneman, 86 N.E. 597, 600 (Ill. 1908). 
84. See 1 KUNIZ, supra note 1, $ 5.4. 
85. Zeigler, 86 N.E. at 601. 
86. Id. 
87. Pure Oil Co. v. Byrnes, 57 N.E.2d 356, 362 (Ill. 1944). 
OIL AND GAS RIGHTS 
being drained or in imminent danger of being drained. As 
would be expected, the nonconsenting cotenants still had the 
right to require an a~counting.~~ 
A statute was passed in 1939 which codified this common 
law rule. It allowed "owners of such majority in interest" t o  
drill and remove oil and gas without consent of the minority 
cotenants if "the oil or gas is being drained or is in imminent 
danger of being drained from such lands by means of wells on 
other lands.7789 This statute has since been amended, deleting 
the requirement that drainage or imminent danger of drainage 
be present. The current statute reads as follows: 
When the right to drill for and remove oil and gas from 
any lands in this State is owned by joint tenants, or tenants 
in common, . . . any one or more of the persons owning a 95 
interest or more in the right to drill for and remove the oil 
and gas from such lands may be authorized to drill for and 
remove oil and gas from such lands in the manner hereinafter 
pr~vided.~' 
Notice that the right "may be authorized" if the consent of a 
majority of cotenants is obtained. The cotenants desiring to 
drill must not only get the requisite consent, but also ask "the 
court for permission to  drill for and remove oil and gas," show- 
ing that the removed minerals will be "for the use and benefit 
of all the owners of. . . such lands."s1 
Like Louisiana, Illinois allows a cotenant to  extract miner- 
als without unanimous consent of the co-owners, so long as a 
certain percentage of cotenants do consent. Once a cotenant 
meets both the consent requirement and obtains authorization 
from the court, he may drill for and extract the oil and gas. A 
nonconsenting cotenant is left with the cause of action to re- 
quire an accounting. 
D. Michigan 
Although Michigan case law is not nearly as extensive as 
that of the states previously discussed, "it is apparent that the 
removal of minerals by a cotenant without the consent of the 
88. Id. 
89. Reward Oil Co. v. White, 77 N.E.2d 436, 437 (Ill. App. Ct. 1948) (quoting 
1945 Ill. Laws ch. 104, ¶¶ 26, 31). 
90. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 765, para. 520/1 (Smith-Hurd 1993) (emphasis added). 
91. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 765, para. 520/2 (Smith-Hurd 1993). 
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other cotenants constitutes waste."92 In 1942, the state passed 
a statute which now governs the right cotenants have t o  ex- 
tract oil and gas. The statute states that, 
Tenants in common, joint owners, cotenants or coparceners as  
hold a majority in interest in the title to such lands or the oil 
and gas rights in such lands shall be authorized to explore, 
drill, mine, develop and operate such lands for oil and gas 
mining purposes and remove and transport oil and gas . . . or 
store the same on said lands, and sell and dispose of the same 
in the manner hereinafter provided." 
Although it appears very similar to Illinois's statutory require- 
m e n t ~ , ~ ~  the Michigan statute is significantly different. Recall 
that in Illinois, the cotenant is required to fvst show a majority 
consent; he is then required to obtain authorization from the 
courts. Michigan only requires that the cotenant obtain majori- 
ty consent. He then "shall" have authority to develop, rather 
than "may" develop as in Illinois. However, like the Illinois 
statute, the Michigan statute does not require proof that the 
land is being drained or in imminent danger of drainage.95 
E. An Evaluation of the Minority Rule 
Although only four states follow the minority rule, and 
each in differing degrees, these, four states do have significant 
oil, gas, and other mineral reserves.g6 As explained earlier, an 
92. 1 KUW, supra note 1, 5 5.4; see also Campbell v. Homer Ore Co., 16 
N.W.2d 125 (Mich. 1944). 
93. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. $ 319.101(1) (West 1984). 
94. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text. 
95. See 2 W.L. SUMMERS, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS 8 222 (1954). 
96. A recent Virginia case seems to express the slim possibility that the num- 
ber of states following the minority rule may become five. The case itself involved 
fractional mineral interests, but the mineral involved was coal rather than oil and 
gas. Eighty-five percent of the owners wanted to mine, while &en percent did 
not. The court defined waste as "[a] destruction or material alteration or deteriora- 
tion of the freehold . . . by any person rightfully in possession, but who has 
not . . . the full estate." Chosar Corp. v. Owens, 370 S.E.2d 305, 307 (Va. 1988) 
(quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1425 (5th ed. 1979)) (emphasis added). Conse- 
quently, it considered that mining without the consent of all owners constituted 
waste. The court wrote, "In the case of tenants in common, no tenant can change 
or alter the common property to the injury of his cotenants without their consent. 
Injunctive relief against a cotenant is proper where the injury is material, continu- 
ing, and not adequately remedied in damages." Id. at 307 (citation omitted). 
The dissent claimed that the above rule is "neither required nor justified by 
existing Virginia law; moreover, it is not sound in principle or logic." Id. at 309 
(Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas would have the applied the "majority rule 
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oil and gas interest has speculative value separate from the 
value of the resources themsel~es.~' Should not this value be 
recognized to the same extent as the value obtained by extract- 
ing the minerals? Should not a co-owner have an equally strong 
right to leave the minerals in the ground as another co-owner% 
right to extract them? Moreover, there is esoteric value to  
Louisiana's argument that it seems illogical to allow one person 
who has an abstract quota of a mineral interest the right to 
take possession of the whole as long as he accounts for profits 
in excess of his proportion. 
As explained earlier, counterarguments exist.g8 Economi- 
cally and socially, it may be wasteful and unfair to allow one 
person with a very small interest to veto the interests of a 
much larger group of cotenants. Furthermore, it may be equally 
unfair to  allow one person holding a fifty-one percent interest, 
who is acting completely unreasonably, to veto the reasonable 
desires of a large group of persons collectively owning forty- 
nine percent of the mineral interest. But, as mentioned, the 
argument is equally legitimate in its reciprocal form. 
Perhaps a more equitable and logical rule could exist some- 
where in between these two conflicting rules. The balance of 
this Comment will propose a model statute which represents 
an attempt to address the values promoted by both the majori- 
ty and minority rules and to  provide cotenants a forum to work 
out differences in a rational and reasonable manner. 
m. A MODEL STATUTE FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF OIL AND 
GAS INTERESTS HEm UNDER JOINT OWNERSHIP 
The substance and procedures contained in this model 
statute are drawn from statutes dealing with another interest 
in property which shares many similar characteristics with oil 
and gas: water rights.gg Many state water codes have elabo- 
regarding extraction of oil and gas." Id. at 310 (Thomas, J., dissenting). This rule 
is the rule that has already been explained above. See supra part 11. 
The dissent was convinced that the majority had moved away from prior analy- 
sis. Whether the court will continue to move toward the minority view is question- 
able; however, the language of the majority opinion could easily support the adop- 
tion of the minority rule in Virginia. 
97. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
98. See supra part 1I.B. 
99. Although significant differences certainly exist, similarities between these 
two rights, especially in the area of co-ownership, allow water statutes dealing 
with co-ownership to provide a useful analogy when dealing with oil and gas 
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rate statutory schemes designed to deal with conflicts that 
arise between co-owners. This Comment draws from this mate- 
rial in developing a model statute to deal with similar conflicts 
arising between cotenants in oil and gas interests. I t  should be 
noted that the water codes used are drawn from western states 
that recognize appropriation, rather than riparian, water 
rights. As a result, much of the material that follows would be 
inapplicable to riparian states. 
In  essence, this model statute establishes an authorization 
process through which a cotenant must go to develop oil and 
gas in common property without the consent of all 
cot en ant^.'^ Under this model statute, a request for authori- 
zation must be either ratified or rejected by the state's oil and 
gas administrative agency. Such agencies are already estab- 
lished and fully capable of performing such a task.''' The au- 
thorization process includes. six steps: (1) the applicant must 
file a request for authorization; (2) the applicant must see that 
notice is provided to all cotenants; (3) the state agency reviews 
the applicant's request; (4) cotenants are given the opportunity 
rights. For example, water interests and oil and gas interests are unique in rela- 
tion to other property interests because of their tendency not to remain stationary. 
ORen, when one speaks of "ownership" of these interests, the term only implies a 
right to use or extract them. Once they are captured, then a more common conno- 
tation of ownership is enjoyed. See 2 OWEN L. ANDERSON & PAULINE M. SIMMONS, 
WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 8 16.01 (Robert E. Beck ed., 1991) (discussing water 
rights); 1 K u N ~ ,  supra note 1, 8 2.4. Furthermore, because good water, oil, and 
gas are all very valuable, conflicts easily arise between people who share common 
ownership interests in the same quantity. 
100. See infia Appendix, MODEL STATUTE: DEVELOPMENT OF OIL AND GAS 
RIGHTS HELD UNDER JOINT OWNERSHIP 8 1-1-01 [hereinafter MODEL STATUTE]. 
101. In most oil and gas states, elaborate administrative agencies oversee the 
oil and gas production within the state. These agencies generally focus on environ- 
mental and conservation issues, and are often preoccupied with pooling and unit- 
ization orders and procedures. Because these agencies are fully operating, having 
them oversee these rather simple proceedings would be no trouble. For some exam- 
ples of statutes establishing, outlining, and governing these agencies, see the fol- 
lowing: 
Alabama: ALA. CODE 8 9-17-3 (1987 & Supp. 1993); 
Alaska: ALASKA STAT. §$ 31.05.005, 31.05.030 (1985); 
Arkansas: ARK. CODE ANN. $8 15-71-101, 15-71-106, 15-71-111 (Michie 1987 & 
Supp. 1991); 
Kentucky: KY. REV. STAT. ANN. $8 353.530, 353.565 (Michie 1993); 
Louisiana: LA. REV. STAT. ANN. $8 30:1, 30:6 (West 1989 & Supp. 1993); 
Mississippi: MISS. CODE ANN. $8 53-1-5, 53-1-7, 53-1-17 (1972 & Supp. 1992); 
Montana: MONT. CODE ANN. $8 82-10-101, 82-11-111, 82-11-144 (1992); 
North Dakota: N.D. CENT. CODE $8 38-08-04, 38-08-09.2 (1987 & Supp. 1993); 
Utah: UTAH CODE ANN. 8 40-6-4 (1993); 
West Virginia: W. VA. CODE §$ 22-8-4, 22-8-11 (1985 & Supp. 1993). 
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to protest the request; (5) the state agency makes its adminis- 
trative decision certifying or denying the request; and (6) either 
the requesting or a protesting party must be given the right to 
appeal that decision. Each of these steps will now be discussed. 
A. Filing a Request for Authorization 
When seeking an allocation or transfer of water rights in 
an appropriation state, the first step a party undertakes is the 
filing of an application for transfer with the state administra- 
tive agency.lo2 Likewise, the first step a cotenant should take 
when attempting to develop the common property is to file a 
request for authorization with the state oil and gas agency.lo3 
The request form, provided by the agency, should not be com- 
plex and should require that three factors be shown, although 
more could be required if the state feels additional information 
is necessary. 
First, the cotenant should show evidence of his interest in 
the land and describe its extent.'* Second, the cotenant 
should show that procedures to  notify the other cotenants are 
underway. The cotenant should be able to provide a list of all 
other oil and gas interest holders in land, with their addresses. 
If some cotenants are unknown or cannot be found, the coten- 
ant would need to show that reasonable efforts have been made 
to  locate these ~otenants. '~~ Third, the cotenant should show 
that he has obtained the consent of a certain percentage of the 
other cotenants. The model statute suggests that the required 
consent should come from at least sixty-five percent of the 
interest in the land and at least a majority of the cotenants 
themselves, without regard to the amount of interest they 
hold. lo6 
102. See generally 2 ANDERSON & SIMMONS, supra note 99, 8 16.01(c); B o ~ i e  
G. Colby et al., Procedural Aspects of State Water Law: Transferring Water Rights 
in the Western States, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 697, 697-706 (1989). 
103. Infra app., MODEL STATUTE 8 1-1-02(1). 
104. Infra app., MODEL STATUTE 8 1-1-02(l)(a). 
105. Infra app., MODEL STATUTE 8 1-1-02(1Xb). 
106. Infra app., MODEL STATUTE 8 1-1-02(1Xc). Perhaps some examples would 
explain this requirement more clearly. Assume that a cotenant held 75% of a min- 
eral interest and the remaining 25% was split among three people. If the majority 
tenant wanted to develop, he has already met the fvst prong because more than 
65% of the interest is represented. However, he would have to convince at least 
two other cotenants and obtain their consent before he could ad.  If only two peo- 
ple shared the remaining 25%, then he would only have to obtain the consent of 
one. 
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Requiring this two-tiered consent would serve several pur- 
poses. Initially, although not as restrictive as the Louisianalo7 
or West Virginia statutes,lo8 it does give minority interest 
holders much more protection than they receive under the 
majority rule. For example, if one cotenant has a large interest, 
he cannot bully the cotenants with smaller interests since he 
needs a majority consent to act. Likewise, a cotenant (or a 
group of cotenants) with very small interests cannot force the 
cotenants with larger percentages to develop the land until 
they have the consent of persons who together hold over 65% of 
the interest. 
Requiring both a percentage of the mineral interest and a 
majority of interest holders is a fair method of protecting both 
cotenants who own a substantial portion of the mineral interest 
and cotenants who hold much smaller percentages. It is reason- 
able that if a majority of interest holders want to develop or 
not develop, their voice should rule. However, it would be un- 
fair for a majority of cotenants, together owning less than 5%, 
to control the common property's development when the minor- 
ity cotenants own the remaining 95%. This two-tiered consent 
requirement would fairly compensate for both situations. Al- 
though the Model Statute sets the requirements a t  65% of the 
interest and a majority of the cotenants, individual states could 
set these standards at whatever level each thinks is most equi- 
table. 
B. Notice to Fellow Cotenants 
In the water transfer process, the next step after filing the 
application is to publish notice alerting other water right hold- 
ers of the potential transfer.lo9 Although an  applicant for a 
water transfer would give public notice, generally in a newspa- 
per, a cotenant seeking authorization to drill should instead be 
required to give notice to other cotenants by certified mail.110 
Now assume that one cotenant held 30% and nine others had equal shares of 
the remaining 70% of the interest. For any one of the minority interest holders to 
develop, he could either get the consent of the majority holder and four other mi- 
nority holders, or of the remaining eight minority holders. 
107. See supra part IIIA. 
108. See supra part 1II.B. 
109. See ARE. REV. STAT. ANN. 9 45-172(7) (1987); NEV. REV. STAT. 9 533.095 
(1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-6 (1989). 
110. Infia app., MODEL STATUTE 5 1-1-03(2). 
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This notice should contain two items. First, the notice 
should describe in sufficient detail the operations that the con- 
senting cotenants propose to perform."' Any lessees involved 
should be listed. The standard defining "sufficient detail" 
should be determined by the state agency. At a minimum, the 
notice should describe all proposed operations, dates, geograph- 
ical locations, and all other relevant information. 
Second, the notice should announce that any cotenant 
protesting this proposed activity shall be given an opportunity 
to be heard.ll2 A protesting cotenant will be provided an in- 
formal hearing with the oil and gas commission and other in- 
terested cotenants. The protesting cotenant should be provided 
with all relevant information about protest procedures, includ- 
ing the time limit in which the protest must be filed, the loca- 
tion where the protest must be filed, and the information that 
the protest should in~lude."~ 
C. Review by the State Agency 
The initial review of the request for authorization by the 
state agency should be brief. Essentially, the state agency 
should make three determinations.'" First, the agency 
should make sure that the cotenant filing the request and all 
those consenting have legitimate interests in the land. All the 
information needed to make this decision should be filed with 
the request. Second, the agency should make sure that the two- 
tiered consent requirement is met. Third, the agency should 
decide whether the proposed operations seeking to  be autho- 
rized are reasonable.'15 If any of these three elements is not 
met, the request should be denied, with immediate notification 
of such denial sent to the requesting cotenant. This notscation 
should contain a brief statement explaining why the request 
was denied.'16 If all elements are met and the request passes 
111. I@a app., MODEL STATUTE 3 1-1-03(l)(a). 
112. Infra app., MODEL STATUTE 3 1-1-03(i)(c). 
113. Infra app., MODEL STATUTE 3 1-1-03(1Xd). 
114. 1nfi.a app., MODEL STATUTE 3 1-1-04. 
115. It is encouraged that this be a very minimal standard of reasonableness. 
It is tempting to simply have a rational standard, but "reasonable" seems to offer 
a little more bite, and if the proposed operations are completely unreasonable, the 
agency should save everyone a lot of time .and deny the request. However, it would 
be expected that very few requests would be denied because they are unreasonable. 
116. I@a app., MODEL STATUTE 3 1-1-04(3). 
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presumption of valid- 
D. Protest 
In a procedure to transfer water rights, after notice is 
given, interested parties are given a certain amount of time to 
file protests.'18 The Model Statute has incorporated a similar 
provi~ion."~ The time limit to protest a proposed transfer of 
water rights generally begins on the last day of public notice 
and can range from ten days to thirty days, or whatever is 
posted in the public notice.120 In a request for an oil and gas 
authorization proceeding, this time period should begin individ- 
ually on the date each cotenant receives notice through certi- 
fied mail. States should set the time limit according to  their 
respective policies and circumstances, always giving reasonable 
time t o  nonconsenting cotenants to  react to the proposal. How- 
ever, the time limit should not be so long that it stifles or is 
detrimental to the efficiency of the authorization process. 
In order to rebut the presumption of validity created after 
a request passes the initial agency review, the protesting coten- 
ant should state specific facts showing why the proposed opera- 
tions are not reasonable.l2' The agency should then review 
the protest. If it determines that the protest is legitimate, pro- 
ceedings should be instigated to resolve the protest. 
1. Informal versus formal resolution 
Because a protest tends to increase the cost and amount of 
time necessary to authorize or deny the request, informal pro- 
ceedings should be utilized to their fullest extent.'" In water 
117. I e a  app., MODEL STATUTE $ 1-1-04(4). 
118. See 2 ANDERSON & SIMMONS, supra note 99, $ 16.01(c); Colby et al., su- 
pra note 102, at  703. 
119. Infia app., MODEL STATUTE 8 1-1-05(1). 
120. See Colby et al., supra note 102, a t  717 tbl. 2. 
121. Infra app., MODEL STATUTE $ 1-1-05(2Xb). The protesting party may rebut 
the presumption of validity by attacking any one of the three findings the state 
agency must initially make. See supra part 1V.C. However, the first two prongs 
should generally not be rebuttable because the state agency will have already veri- 
fied whether or not they are met. Therefore, the third prong, finding whether the 
proposed application is reasonable, should (if the agency is doing its job) be the 
only finding that could be attacked. 
122. Commentators have noted that when protests are Ned in water transfer 
proceedings, the process enters into a "critical and costly part" which can signifi- 
cantly delay the process. Colby et al., supm note 102, at 703. For a detailed analy- 
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transfers, "informal hearings are preferred by the State Engi- 
neer, the applicants and the protestors. Informal proceedings 
encourage openness in which the parties state their positions in 
dialogue form."lB 
Because "informal" resolution of conflicts is generally "the 
least expensive and swiftest'' means to resolve protests,lZ4 the 
Model Statute provides only for informal proceedings in which 
a protester has a forum t o  present his arguments on why the 
proposed action should not be allowed.'* These informal pro- 
ceedings should be conducted by the state agency and governed 
by the state administrative procedure act. 
2. Burden of proof 
As mentioned, the requesting cotenant should have an 
initial burden of proof of showing three items in his request for 
authori~ation.'~~ Once this initial burden is met, the request 
should be presumed to be valid. The protesting cotenant should 
then have the burden of proof to  state specific facts showing 
why the proposal is ~nreasonable.'~' If the protester does pro- 
duce evidence demonstrating that the proposal is not reason- 
able and should not be authorized, the requesting cotenant may 
rebut that evidence. However, in the end, the protesting party 
should always have the burden of persua~ion.'~~ Because of 
the fairly high consent requirements a cotenant must initially 
pass, a protesting cotenant should provide a convincing case to 
obtain a denial of the request. 
E. The State Agency's Decision 
After a request for authorization is filed, and either the 
time for protest has passed with no protests filed, or after an 
informal hearing has been conducted, the state agency should 
give an authorization or denial of the request. If the request 
has passed the initial agency review, and no protests have been 
sis on the effect of protests on the water transfer process, see 1 LAWRENCE J. 
MACDONNELL, THE WATER TRANSFER PROCESS AS A MANAGEMENT OPTION FOR 
MEETING CHANGING WATER DEMANDS 46-48 (1990). 
123. Ray J. Davis, Utah Water Rights Transfer Law, 31 A m .  L. REV. 841, 854 
(1989). 
124. Colby et al., supra note 102, at 704. 
125. Ifia app., MODEL STATUTE $ 1-1-05(2)(b). 
126. See supra part IVA. 
127. See supra note 121. 
128. See infia app., MODEL STATUTE $ 1-1-05(2)(b). 
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filed, it should be authorized. A similar result should occur if a 
nonconsenting cotenant cannot convince the agency that the 
request is unrea~onable.'~~ 
Furthermore, if the cotenant can show that the land is 
being drained or is in imminent danger of being drained, the 
request to drill should be per se rea~onable.'~~ 
F. Review of the State Agency's Decision 
Any party involved in an informal hearing may appeal the 
agency's deci~ion.'~' This appeal may either be to the judicia- 
ry or  within the administrative system, whichever is provided 
for in the state's administrative procedure statutes. In water 
transfer proceedings, the time a party is allowed to prepare an 
appeal ranges from ffieen to thirty-five days.ls2 The time 
limit should allow the appellant a reasonable time to prepare 
an appeal, but should be short enough for review while the 
facts are fresh. 
Because the state agency is specially trained in dealing 
with oil and gas issues, the reviewing body should use the 
abuse of discretion standard rather than perform a de novo 
hearing.lss In relation to water transfer hearings, Schuh v. 
State Department of ~ c o l o g y ' l  recognized that "due deference 
must given 'to the specialized knowledge and expertise of the 
administrative agency.' Here, the [state agency] is in a far 
better position to judge what is in the public interest regarding 
water permits than a co~r t . " '~  Many other states have ex- 
pressed similar views.'= Proceedings performed by the state 
oil and gas agency should receive similar deference. 
The reviewing body should answer three questions: "[Flirst, 
did the agency act within the scope of its delegated authority; 
second, did the agency employ fair procedures; and third, was 
129. See supra note 121. 
130. Infia app., MODEL STATUTE Q 1-1-04(3). 
131. Infia app., MODEL STATUTE 8 1-1-M(1). 
132. See Colby et al., supra note 102, a t  719 tbl. 4. 
133. Infia app., MODEL STATUTE 9 1-1-M(2). 
134. 667 P.2d 64 (Wash. 1983). 
135. Id. at 68 (quoting English Bay Enters. Ltd. v. Island County, 568 P.2d 
783, 786 (Wash. 1977)). 
136. See National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 731 (Cal.), 
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983); In re Change of Appmpriation Water Rights, 816 
P.2d 1054, 1060 (Mont. 1991); In re Applications T-61 & T-62, 440 N.W.2d 466, 
470 (Neb. 1989); Revert v. Ray, 603 P.2d 262, 264 (Nev. 1979); Wyoming State 
Eng'r v. Willadsen, 792 P.2d 1376, 1379 (Wyo. 1990). 
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the agency action reasonable."13' When answering the third 
question, the reviewing body should only look for abuse of dis- 
cretion and "not substitute its independent policy judg- 
ment."'" It should uphold the agency's action "unless the ac- 
tion is arbitrary, capricious, o r  lacking in evidentiary sup- 
port."lsg 
As the law currently stands, a state has only two fairly 
rigid rules to choose from when presented with the issue of a 
cotenant developing the common property without the consent 
of the other cotenants. The majority rule strongly favors the 
cotenant desiring to develop, essentially giving him an unquali- 
fied right to extract the oil, notwithstanding the other 
cotenants' desires. On the other hand, the minority rule simi- 
larly favors the nonconsenting party. Neither rule has a safety 
valve to protect against unreasonable behavior by either group 
of cotenants, and neither rule recognizes that oil and gas inter- 
ests are often valued in different ways. 
This Comment proposes a possible solution. The significant 
number of cases discussing this issue shows that the problem is 
a difficult one. This middle-of-the-road approach gives minority 
cotenants some say in how the common property should be 
developed, but not an overriding veto. However, after the con- 
sent requirements are met, the reasonable aspirations of a 
majority of cotenants and super-majority of the actual interest 
should be enabled to proceed. 
Curtis Anderson 
137. United States v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 227 Cal. Rptr. 161, 
176 (Ct. App. 1986) (quoting California Hotel & Motel Ass'n v. Industrial Welfare 
Comm'n, 599 P.2d 31 (Cal. 1979)). 
138. Id. 
139. Id. 
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DEVELOPMENT OF OIL AND GAS RIGHTS HELD 
UNDER JOINT OWNERSHIP 
1-1-01 Purpose of the Statute 
The purpose of this model statute is to address the needs of both 
minority and majority interests in oil and gas rights under joint own- 
ership. This statute seeks to protect both interests by providing re- 
quirements a cotenant must meet before he or she can develop the 
common property without full consent of all cotenants, and by provid- 
ing a forum in which protesting cotenants may present opposing 
arguments against development. All applications and hearings will be 
brought before the State Oil and Gas Agency. 
1-1-02 Application for Authorization of the Proposed Development 
(1) An application for the development of oil and gas interests 
held in joint ownership must be filed with the State Agency. Such 
application shall be upon forms furnished by the State Agency and 
shall provide the following: 
(a) The cotenant shall provide evidence of his or her interest 
in the land and adequately describe its extent. 
(b) The cotenant shall show that procedures to notify all 
other cotenants are underway. To fblfil this requirement, the 
cotenant need only show that the cotenants owning oil and gas 
interests, not surface interests, are being notified. If some 
cotenants are unknown or cannot be found, the cotenant must 
show that reasonable efforts have been exerted to locate these 
cotenants. 
(c) The cotenant must obtain the consent of: 
(i) a t  least sixty-five percent (65%) of the oil and gas 
interests in the land; and 
(ii) a majority of the cotenants themselves, without 
regard to the amount of interest they hold. 
(2) The cotenant shall provide adequate evidence and documen- 
tation which allows the State Agency to verify each element in sub- 
section (1). 
(3) The State Agency may require an application fee to 
accompany the application. 
1-1-03 Notice to Fellow Cotenants 
(1) The applicant shall give all other cotenants, to the extent 
possible, notice of the proposed development. The notice shall provide: 
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(a) a description sufficiently detailing what operations the 
applicant (and those consenting) proposes to perform, including 
dates, geographical locations, and other relevant information; 
(b) a list of all lessees involved or potentially involved; 
(c) an announcement that any cotenant protesting this ac- 
tion shall be given an opportunity to be heard; and 
(d) an announcement that a cotenant wishing to protest 
shall be given all relevant information about protest procedures, 
including the time limit to file a protest, the information the 
protest should include, and any costs. 
(2) All notice shall be provided by certified mail. 
1-1-04 Review by the State Agency 
(1) Approval of the State Agency is required for any development 
of oil and gas interests held in joint ownership. 
(2) The agency shall determine whether the applicant has met 
all the requirements listed in section 1-1-02. 
(3) The agency shall then determine whether the proposed devel- 
opment is reasonable. 
(4) If the application passes subsections (2) and (3), it shall then 
be given a presumption of validity. 
(5) If the application fails any requirement in section 1-1-02 or is 
found to be an unreasonable proposal, i t  shall be denied. 
(6) The state agency shall notify the applicant as to its finding 
under subsection (4) or (5). If the agency denies the application, i t  
shall provide a brief statement explaining the reason(s) why the ap- 
plication was denied. 
1-1-05 Protest 
(1) Any cotenant desiring to protest an application for develop- 
ment of oil and gas interests shall file notice with the State Agency 
within (2 working days following the date the cotenant was noti- 
fied by certified mail. The State Agency must fully consider the evi- 
dence provided by such person during the review of the application. 
(2) The applicant has the initial burden of showing the require- 
ments in section 1-1-02 and that the proposal is reasonable. 
(a) The agency should carry out investigations to confirm or 
rebut the evidence presented by the applicant if necessary. 
(b) If the applicant has met this initial burden, a presump- 
tion is created in his or her favor. If a protesting party presents 
evidence sufficient to rebut any element required to be shown by 
the applicant, the agency should conduct a hearing to resolve the 
conflict. Informal procedures must be exhausted before formal 
procedures are instituted. The burden of persuasion will be on 
the protesting party. 
1346 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I993 
(c) Informal hearings shall be governed by the State Ad- 
ministrative Procedure Act. 
(3) If informal procedures are used, after each protesting coten- 
ant  has had a reasonable opportunity to be heard, the State Agency 
shall either authorize or deny the application. 
1-1-06 Review of the Agency Decision 
(1) Any party involved in an informal hearing may appeal the 
State Agency's decision. Such appeals will be conducted according to 
the State Administrative Procedure Act. 
(2) The reviewing body shall apply an arbitrary and capricious or 
an abuse of discretion standard to the agency's decision. Because the 
agency is specially trained in dealing with oil and gas issues, i t  
should be accorded a high degree of deference. 
